Negotiations-Iran

 http://www.iranintelligence.com/negotiations
Since the discovery of Iran's covert nuclear weapons program, the international community has used diplomatic means to try and convince Iran to end its project. A variety of incentives have been offered to the Iranians and all of the negotiations have recognized Iran's inherent right to pursue nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The hope was that a diplomatic agreement would stop Iran from developing a bomb and thus forestall the need to impose sanctions on Iran or raise the military option.

However, while the Iranians have agreed at times to negotiate, not even the threats of sanctions or military actions have persuaded the mullahs to abandon their nuclear program. In fact, the Iranians have openly admitted that they have dragged out talks while accelerating their project.

Jump to:
- First Diplomatic Efforts
- Setback in Negotiations
- Incentivizing Iranian Compliance
- Hint of Compromise?
- Israel's Red Line Worked
- Can IAEA Stop Iranian Breakout?
- Talks Fail Again
- Will Rouhani Change Iran's Policy?
- Let's Make a Deal?

First Diplomatic Efforts

The first effort to reach a diplomatic solution was in 2003 when Britain, France and Germany offered Iran incentives to stop their nuclear program. It is an indication of how concerned the international community is as the prospect of a nuclear Iran that it was Europeans countries, not Israel or the United States, which took the first steps to try to stop the Iranians. Those talks resulted in no agreement; in fact, Iranian officials boasted they continued their research while they were going on.

Iran agreed in a meeting in Tehran with French, German, and British ambassadors on November 14, 2004, to immediately suspend its nuclear programs in exchange for European guarantees that it will not face the prospect of UN Security Council sanctions as long as their agreement holds. The Bush administration was dissatisfied and said Tehran needed to convince the world it is not a danger (Washington Post, November 15, 2004).


Shortly after the Iranian-European agreement, the National Council of Resistance said Iran had bought blueprints for a nuclear bomb and obtained weapons-grade uranium on the black market. The group also charged that Iran was still secretly enriching uranium at an undisclosed Defense Ministry site in Tehran (New York Times, November 18, 2004).
Secretary of State Colin Powell also said the United States had intelligence indicating Iran was trying to fit ballistic missiles to carry nuclear weapons, which he intimated would only make sense if Iran was also developing or planning to develop a nuclear capability. "There is no doubt in my mind - and it's fairly straightforward from what we've been saying for years - that they have been interested in a nuclear weapon that has utility, meaning that it is something they would be able to deliver, not just something that sits there," Powell said (Washington Post, November 18, 2004).
Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rohani claimed a "great victory" over the U.S. at the end of November 2004 after the UN said it would not punish Iran's nuclear activities with sanctions. Rohani said Iran would never give up its right to nuclear power and stressed during talks with European countries that Iran's freeze on uranium enrichment was only temporary (BBC News, November 30, 2004). President Bush said on November 30, "The Iranians agreed to suspend but not terminate their nuclear weapons program. Our position is that they ought to terminate their nuclear weapons program" (Reuters, November 30, 2004).

Setback in Negotiations

In February 2005, Ali Agha Mohammadi, spokesman of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said Iran will never scrap its nuclear program, and talks with the Europeans are aimed at protecting the country's nuclear achievements, not negotiating an end to them. This view was reiterated in March by Rohani, who said, the country would never permanently cease enriching uranium, and warned that if the United States went to the United Nations Security Council to seek sanctions against Iran, "the security and stability of the region would become a problem."
In May 2005, Iran confirmed that it had converted 37 tons of uranium into gas, its first acknowledgment of advances made in the production process for enriched uranium. This meant Tehran could start enriching uranium quickly if negotiations with the Europeans over the future of its nuclear program failed (AP, May 9, 2005). On July 27, Iran's departing president, Mohammad Khatami, said, regardless of Europe's position, "we will definitely resume work in Isfahan," the site of a uranium processing plant. On August 1, Iran said Iranian technicians would break UN seals on the Isfahan nuclear plant, allowing uranium processing to resume. Reprocessing uranium is a step below uranium enrichment, which was to remain suspended (Jerusalem Post, August 1, 2005).
In late August 2005, European powers called off talks with Iran about its nuclear program scheduled for August 31. French Foreign Ministry spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei said talks on a formal European proposal made earlier this month would not go ahead because Iran had resumed certain nuclear work in breach of a promise to freeze it while talks lasted (Reuters, August 24, 2005).
In early November 2005, Iran rejected a call by European ministers for it to heed a resolution of the IAEA calling for a renewed freeze on all activities related to uranium enrichment (Jerusalem Post, November 6, 2005). Iran began converting a new batch of uranium at the Isfahan facility, a move seen as provocative after rejecting international pleas to suspend such work (Washington Post, November 17, 2005).
The one remaining diplomatic option to avoid pursuing sanctions against Iran failed on March 12, 2006, when Iran rejected an offer from Russia to enrich uranium on its behalf. Negotiations on the proposal were widely viewed as merely a tactical strategy Tehran was using to continue its program while staving off referral to the UN.
Iran's Foreign Minister subsequently rejected the principle of a European package that would require Teheran to suspend uranium enrichment in exchange for support to a civilian nuclear program.
In May 2006, the United States said it would join multilateral talks with Iran if Tehran suspended enrichment. The P5+1 – the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, Russia, France, Britain & the United States) and Germany – offered the Iranians a package of incentives, but Iran rejected the offer three months later.

Incentivizing Iranian Compliance

In May 2008, the P5+1 offered Iran yet another package of incentives to stop their nuclear program. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded that Iran would not give up its "rights." despite Western pressure. "Threatening the Iranian nation will not make it retreat," he told a rally (Reuters, May 5, 2008).
A month later, in June 2008, the P5+1 offered Iran technical and commercial incentives to suspend uranium enrichment. A few weeks later, the powers held talks in Geneva, attended for the first time by a senior U.S. official, aimed at reaching an agreement with Iran and forestalling further sanctions. A senior Iranian official, however, ruled out any freeze in uranium enrichment (Reuters, July 20, 2008). Five days later, the head of Iran's nuclear agency, Iranian Vice President Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, announced Iran would no longer cooperate with IAEA experts investigating the country's clandestine nuclear weapons program (Washington Post, July 24, 2008). Shortly thereafter, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had doubled the number of centrifuges operating a year earlier at its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, evidence of the progress Iran had made toward developing a nuclear weapon (Washington Post, July 26, 2008).
In May 2009, Ahmadinejad rejected a Western proposal for it to "freeze" its nuclear program in return for no new sanctions and ruled out any talks with major powers on the issue (Reuters, May 25, 2009). The Obama Administration offered to allow Iran to receive uranium enriched to nearly 20 percent to fuel a medical research reactor if it agreed to send its stockpile of uranium outside the country. Iran rejected the offer.
In 2012, the P5+1 made yet another offer to provide fuel for a research reactor, in addition to agreeing to supply spare parts for civilian aircraft and foregoing additional sanctions. Iran was asked again to give up its stockpile of uranium and to stop its enrichment activities. Iran again refused and continues to steadily advance toward the completion of the nuclear fuel cycle and the capability to build a bomb.
In the final debate of the 2012 presidential campaign, President Obama warned that negotiations could not drag on indefinitely:

The clock is ticking. We're not going to allow Iran to perpetually engage in negotiations that lead nowhere. And I've been very clear to them, you know ... we have a sense of when they would get breakout capacity, which means that we would not be able to intervene in time to stop their nuclear program, and that clock is ticking.

Hint of Compromise or More Stonewalling?

At the begining of 2013, negotiations between UN inspectors and Iran - aimed at securing access to the Parchin facility, where it is widely suspected that Iranian scientists conducted work related to nuclear detonations - once again ended without progress. Further talks regarding Parchin are expected to take place later in the year, however no dates were set.
For the first time in eight months negotiations resumed February 26, 2013. Iran held talks in Almaty, Kazakhstan, with the United States and other world powers to try to end the conflict over Iran's nuclear program. The talks were supposed to last only one day, but because of signs of progress, a second day was added. Afterward, Tehran's chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili, said the last proposal from his interlocutors was a possible "turning point."
Jalili's optimism appeared to based on concessions made by the United States and its partners rather than any compromises by Iran. "It was they who tried to get closer to our point of view," Jalili said, while adding that there remained "a long distance to the desirable point."
In fact, in May 2012, the P5+1 insisted that Iran shut down its Fordow nuclear plant and ship its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium out of the country before sanctions would be lifted. In Almaty, however, the demand was reduced to asking Iran to suspend operations at Fordow while allowing Iran to retain some of its 20 percent-enriched uranium in exchange for easing economic sanctions.
Ultimately, the only agreement reached was to hold additional meetings in March and April. The discussions raised hopes that an agreement could be reached to avoid the necessity of a military operation. On the other hand, Iran has given indications in the past that it would negotiate a deal, but then backed off while accelerating the nuclear program.
Iran's recent actions also suggested it is simply using the talks to buy time to build a nuclear bomb or, at least, reach the capability to do so quickly. For example, the week before the meeting in Almaty, the IAEA reported that Iran was installing centrifuges at their main uranium enrichment site at a faster rate than anticipated. The IAEA also revealed that Iran was continuing to work on a heavy-water plant at Arak that could be used to produce plutonium for bombs.
The Washington Post editorialized after the Almaty talks:

If Iran altered its own, unacceptable proposals from previous rounds, there was no indication of it in the accounts of either side. That raises the possibility that the regime will simply pocket the easier terms and return to its stonewalling, with the expectation that another crumbling of the coalition position will ensue. In recent months, Tehran has avoided crossing Israel's red line for military action by keeping its stockpile of -medium-enriched uranium below the quantity needed for a bomb, but it has also begun installing a new generation of centrifuges, which could move it much closer to a breakout capacity. Maybe these zigs and zags, like Mr. Jalili's declarations, are the prelude to a compromise. But history suggests they are the tactics of a regime convinced that it can outlast and outmaneuver the United States and its partners (Washington Post, February 28, 2013).

Gen. James Mattis, head of U.S. Central Command also expressed skepticism about negotiations. He told a Senate hearing that Iran has a history of denial and deceit and is "enriching uranium beyond any plausible peaceful purpose." He added that he believed Iran was using negotiations to buy time (Huffington Post, March 5, 2013).
Another fruitless round of talks was held in Almaty on April 5-6, 2013. Western officials reported the two sides remained far apart while Iranian souces claimed victory. Fars News said Iran did not give in to Western pressures and continued to "insist on its national interests." The 5+1 were losers, the agency said, because "the earlier calculations and assumptions regarding the impact of sanctions on Iran to give up its nuclear right have failed" (Fars News, April 8, 2013).
Secretary of State Kerry's response to the failure of the talks was to reiterate the hope for a peaceful end to the standoff, but warned that negotiations were not an "interminable process" (The Guardian, April 7, 2013).

Israel's Red Line Worked

Israel has consistently argued that diplomacy will only succeed if it is accompanied by a credible military threat. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was widely mocked when he spoke at the UN in September 2012 and drew a "cartoonish" picture of a bomb with a red line representing the point when Iran accumulated enough 20% enriched uranium to produce a bomb with further processing. A Washington Post editorial said proponents of diplomacy over war with Iran should now thank Netanyahu for setting a "red line" because it "appears to have accomplished what neither negotiations nor sanctions have yielded: concrete Iranian action to limit its enrichment." Specifically, Iran diverted 40% of its 20% uranium for use in a research reactor, to keep its stockpile of highly enriched uranium below the Israeli red line.
The Post added:

Mr. Netanyahu's red line is only a partial and temporary check on the Iranian threat. The ongoing installation of a new generation of faster centrifuges could soon make it obsolete by providing a new means for Iran to quickly produce bomb-grade uranium. But the lesson here is twofold: The credible threat of military action has to be part of any strategy for preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon, and clear red lines can help create the "time and space for diplomacy" that President Obama seeks. Mr. Obama, who last year stiffly resisted pressure from Mr. Netanyahu to spell out U.S. red lines, ought to reconsider (Washington Post, April 9, 2013).

Meanwhile, Iranian officials remain defiant. Mohammad Reza Naqdi, head of Basij of the Oppressed Organization, declared that"Those who recommend that we either compromise or negotiate with the US are undoubtedly either unwise or traitors… We categorically declare that the US is not a friend of ours, and any negotiation with it is an indication of treason or lack of discretion… Certain people recommend that we negotiate, whereas today we need an uprising (against the U.S. power) rather than negotiation and compromise" (Siasatema.com, April, 29, 2013).

Can The IAEA Stop An Iranian Breakout?

Some people argue it is not necessaryt to take precipitous action against Iran because they believe the IAEA can detect when Iran is about to build a bomb and the international community will then have an opportunity to take action. According to Olli Heinoman, a 27-year veteran of IAEA inspection work, Iran may have already passed the point of no return as a result of the IAEA's failure to document the extent of Iran's program earlier. He also argued that Iran's breakout would likely occur before measures could be taken to stop it. Heinoman said that if the IAEA inspectors detected an Iranian breakout, it could take up to two weeks before they could reach Iran's enrichment plant. Often the inspections are carried out after giving 10 days notice while surprise inspections may be carried out with two hours' notice. Once the inspectors discovered Iran's progress, they would have to report back to the IAEA board, which would subsequently alert the UN Security Council. Heinoman said the whole process would probably take a month, during which time Iran could enrich enough uranium for a bomb. He believes Iran already has the capability to build a weapon, it just needs to make the decision to move forward (Wall Street Journal, March 2-3, 2013).

Talks Fail Again

The IAEA held the latest of 10 rounds of talks with Iran in the last 1.5 years in Istanbul on May 15, 2013. It was also the first meeting in six weeks, since the last ones held in Almaty where Iran's response to P5+1 proposals were described as  "very disappointing" and "would place little or no constraint on its current nuclear activities, while demanding that major sanctions be removed immediately." In Turkey, Iran offered no concessions and continued to insist on its right to enrich uranium (IBN News, May 17; Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 2013).
A report by The Project on U.S. Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy outlined the terms the United States should demand before lifting any sanctions:

- Suspension by Iran of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and all work on heavy water-related projects.
- Allowing IAEA inspectors to verify all Iranian actions and to resolve all outstanding issues.
- A complete accounting of Iran's past and current nuclear weapons related activities.
- Closure of the Fordow facility and any other underground enrichment facilities.
- Permitting IAEA to conduct intrusive and comprehensive inspections that will allow it to ensure that Iran remains in compliance with its agreement to halt all nuclear weapons-related work (U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy for the Changing Middle East, January 2013).

Other analysts argue that sanctions should be intensified and include doing more to prevent the illicit import of centrifuge equipment because upgrading the type and increasing the number of centrifuges. They warn that if Tehran accumulates enough uranium enriched to 20 percent, it can produce enough weapons-grade uranium in a week or two. Once Iran reaches this “breakout capacity,” it will be too late to prevent the country from obtaining nuclear weapons (Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2013).

Will “Moderate” Iranian President Change Policy?

The June 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran's new president has been trumpeted by the media as a shift toward moderation in Iran and raised hopes that negotiations can finally resolve the stalemate over Iran's nuclear program. The election of Rouhani, however, changes nothing in Iran's strategic vision for its nuclear program. As Iran's chief nuclear negotiator in the early 2000's, Rouhani never agreed to any real compromise with the West and later admitted that the temporary suspension of certain elements of the program in 2003 was a ploy to enable Iran to build up its nuclear infrastructure. In 2004, he spoke of using a “calculated strategy” in negotiations with the EU3 – France, UK, and Germany – to buy time and then finding "the most suitable time to do away with the suspension” (Reuters, June 19, 2013). In his first press conference as president-elect, he announced that “the era of suspension is gone” (Rouhani.Ir, June 18, 2013). Rouhani also posted a photo on his facebook page showing him surrounded by people carrying placards reading “Death to Israel”, “Death to America” [President Rouhani's web site] - The Facebook page was apparently taken down].

Rouhani may present a more reasonable facade, but he has always been a staunch supporter of the Islamic Revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini. He subsequently became a close political ally of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and served as his personal assistant to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). Rouhani also served as national security advisor to past presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani who oversaw the advancement of Iran's nuclear program (Iran Affairs, February 5, 2010).
Rouhani's comparative restraint, however, is irrelevant to the nuclear question since Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guard control Iran's nuclear policy (The Tower, June 16, 2013). Rouhani has no mandate to modify Iran's position toward its right to enrich uranium and has given no indication that he has any desire to do so anyways. Following his electoral victory, Rouhani pledged to continue to safeguard Iran's “inalienable rights” to nuclear power (JTA, June 18, 2013). In addition, Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, head of the Islamic Republic's Atomic Energy Organization, said production of nuclear fuel would “continue in line with our declared goals. The enrichment linked to fuel production will also not change” (Haaretz, July 3, 2013).
The constraints on Rouhani were reinforced by Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, member of the Assembly of Experts, who said: “We will support the President Elect (Rouhani) as long as he remains on the path of Velayat (the Supreme Leader)… If we notice that some radical or far-left people, who led the 1988 sedition (referring to the post-June 2009 presidential election protest – reformists and Green Movement leaders), are aligning themselves with this government, the President Elect should be and no doubt will be criticized… Velayat-e faqih is the nation’s compass in the Islamic Republic’s system and nobody, not even the President Elect, has a right to take positions against it” (Tasnim; ISNA, July 3, 2013).
Western nations want to give the new president a chance to negotiate a solution, but talks aren't expected for at least several weeks and this is just additional time for Iran to make further advancements in its nuclear program. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei threw cold water on those expecting a change in Iran's position. “I am not optimistic about negotiations with the Americans...the Americans are unreliable and illogical and they are not frank in their interactions… The stands adopted by US officials during the recent few months, too, once again confirmed the necessity of being pessimistic about them” (Office of the Supreme Leader, July 22, 2013).
Meanwhile, President Obama is being pressured by members of Congress to give negotiations with Rouhani a chance. A letter signed by 131 members says that given the stakes involved for the United States, Israel, and the international community, it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani’s election represents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement that prevents Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.” The letter, circulated by Representatives David Price (D-North Carolina) and Charles Dent (R-Pennsylvania), sends a clear message to Israel regarding any preemptive measures against Iran: “We must also be careful not to foreclose the possibility of such progress by taking provocative actions that could weaken the newly elected president’s standing relative to Iran’s hardliners” (The Back Channel, July 18, 2013). Iran welcomed the letter but a spokesman said that the United States would have to take dozens of other steps to resume relations with Tehran (IRNA, July 22, 2013).
Even as some members of Congress push for negotiations, others are planning to pass legislation that would place even stricter sanctions on Iran. The proposed legislation would blacklist Iran’s mining and construction sectors, which are linked to the Revolutionary Guard corps. Supporters also want to stop all Iranian oil sales worldwide by 2015. The legislation is likely to pass, despite the objections of the administration, but not until the fall (Times of Israel, July 23, 2013). In addition, 76 senators from both parties urged President Obama to keep the pressure on Iran and keep a military option on the table. “Until we see a significant slowdown of Iran’s nuclear activities, we believe our nation must toughen sanctions and reinforce the credibility of our option to use military force at the same time as we fully explore a diplomatic solution to our dispute with Iran,” the senators wrote (Telegraph, August 3, 2013).
Since his inauguration Rouhani has begun to speak out about Iran's nuclear interests and does not sound conmpromising. “Iran’s peaceful nuclear program is a national and cross-party issue,” he said. “The relevant principles will be safeguarded. It means that the government stresses that Iran’s nuclear rights are based on international regulations, and we will not give up people’s rights…” (Parsine.com, August 7, 2013; Fars News Agency, August 8, 2013). An editorial in Etemaad (reformist) extols Rouhani’s past nuclear achievements as “a successful record,” arguing that “as the chief nuclear negotiator and with his prudence and unique planning, he was able to protect Iran’s nuclear technology and nuclear installations (reference to the UCF in Isfahan) from any harm or invasion (Magiran.com, August 8, 2013).
Others in the Iranian hierarchy have continued their belligerent statements directed at Israel. Yahya Rahim Safavi, senior military advisor to the Supreme Leader and former IRGC Commander said, “Iran’s national might in political, security and economic fields has increased, and today we have turned into the region’s super power.” During Quds Day rallies, “referred to “the huge problems the Zionist regime is facing” its imminent downfall. “The (only) strategy to liberate Palestine,” Safavi added, “is the continuation of armed jihad and Islamic resistance until the fall of the Zionists, and this is the only strategy to liberate honorable Quds and return the Palestinians their land and rights” (SepahNews, August 7, 2013).

Let's Make A Deal?

In September 2013, expectations over a breakthrough in talks with Iran were heightened when both President Rouhani and U.S. President Obama made conciliatory statements that seemed to hint at the prospect of a meeting between the leaders at the annual meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Meanwhile, however, Rouhani said the West must recognize Iran's nuclear and enrichment rights as part of international law and he made no plans to stop centrifuges from spinning in their nuclear facilities. (Mehrnews, September 23, 2013)
While Obama and Rouhani did not meet at the UN, they did hold an arranged telephone conversation regarding the future of Iran's nuclear program. The conversation - the first between U.S. and Iranian leaders since the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis - was aimed at defusing the dispute over Iran's nuclear program and afterward both leaders expressed optimism at the prospect of a rapprochement that would transform the Middle East. (New York Times, September 27, 2013)
"Resolving this issue, obviously, could also serve as a major step forward in a new relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, one based on mutual interests and mutual respect," President Obama said. Rouhani noted on his Twitter account that "in regards to [the] nuclear issue, with political will, there is a way to rapidly solve the matter."
President Obama also instructed Secretary of State John Kerry - in close coordination with the European Union, Russia and China - to pursue diplomacy with Iran regarding its nuclear program. Obama stressed that America prefers to resolve the issue diplomatically but that the use of force is not off the table. (White House, September 24, 2013)