Although the formal map of the Middle East
has not changed since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring (with the
exception of Sudan), the old borders do not reflect the reality on the ground.
As a result of the regional upheavals, tribal, sectarian, and ethnic identities
have become more pronounced than ever, which may well lead to a change in the
borders drawn by the colonial powers a century ago that have since been
preserved by Arab autocrats. The changes to date have occurred inside the
existing borders, but this may change. States are liable to disintegrate by
going through stages of federalization, agreed-upon separation, or autonomy. In
general, the international community is opposed to any changes in borders and
the dissolution of states, believing that any change of the status quo is
liable to destabilize the region and even the world. However, in the context of
the regional turmoil, the Arab peoples are seeking the freedom to live in
political settings that suit their respective identities.
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Although the formal map of the Middle
East has not changed since the onset of the so-called Arab Spring (with the
exception of Sudan), the old borders do not reflect the reality on the ground.
As a result of the regional upheavals, tribal, sectarian, and ethnic identities
have become more pronounced than ever, which may well lead to a change in the
borders drawn by the colonial powers a century ago that have since been preserved
by Arab autocrats. The iron-fisted Arab rulers were an artificial glue of
sorts, holding together different, sometimes hostile sects in an attempt to
form a single nation state. Now, the de facto changes in the Middle East map
could cause far-reaching geopolitical shifts affecting alliance formations and
even the global energy market.
The Kurds in Syria are likely to try to
establish an independent political entity in the areas under their control.
Unlike other minorities in Syria, the Kurds (numbering about 3 million and in control
of most of Syria’s oil reserves) have suffered much persecution. The Kurdish
militias have exploited the chaos in the country and seized control of areas in
the northeast abandoned by the Syrian army. Senior Kurdish officials have
declared that the Kurds are interested in establishing an independent zone, and
the Kurdish National Council, a representative body comprised of most of the
Kurdish political parties, signed an agreement with the Syrian National Council
whereby the Kurds would enjoy some type of autonomy in the future united Syrian
state. But until Syria unites again it may be that Kurdish autonomy will be a
fait accompli. At the same time, this possibility is overshadowed by divisions
among the Kurdish organizations, some of which are supported by elements
outside of Syria.
The possible model of independent Kurdish
autonomy in Syria is anchored in the successful model of Kurdish autonomy on
the other side of the border, in Iraq. While the Kurds in Iraq continue to take
an active part in the country’s political process, Kurdistan is enjoying
self-government in almost every aspect of life. The district is run by an
independent parliament, and the Kurdish armed forces are separate from Iraq’s
security establishment. In recent months, and to Baghdad’s chagrin, Kurdistan
has even started to sign independent oil and gas discovery and production
contracts with foreign energy companies. The Kurdish zone enjoys the highest
levels of security and economic growth in Iraq and provides training and arms support
to the Kurds in Syria.
Other parts of Iraq are also suffering
from uncertainty. Since the withdrawal of the US forces, the violent sectarian
struggle has intensified. The ongoing frustration of the Sunnis, who were cut
out of the country’s leadership, has been manifested in deadly attacks on Iraqi
cities at a frequency and intensity not seen since 2008. Islamist elements from
Syria and Iraq that have joined forces have increased the risk of a destructive
civil war. Iraqi nationalism is still dominant in Iraq and significant
separatist movements are not prevalent, but the notion of a federalized entity
has gained acceptance in recent years. In fact, the Iraqi constitution allows
for provinces to assume a certain amount of self-government. As early as 2011,
four Sunni provinces decided to begin a process that would culminate in their
autonomy, despite Baghdad’s disapproval. In recent years, many Sunni and
Shiites politicians have called for separation from the Iraqi state, following
the Kurdish model. Continued sectarian violence could result in a divided Iraq,
and ultimately in the dissolution of the Iraqi state, leading to a de facto
Sunni state, with the south of Iraq becoming a Shiite state under Iranian
patronage.
Libya too is disintegrating. The Libyan
uprising was primarily aimed at Qaddafi’s regime, but it also reflected
Benghazi’s desire to end to the dominance of the central government in Tripoli.
Historically, the borders of the Libyan state encompass three different ethnic
groups in three distinct regions: Tripolitania in the country’s northwest;
Cyrenaica in the east, which sees Benghazi as its capital and is home to most
of the nation’s oil reserves; and Fezzan in the southwest. Cyrenaicans feel
that, similar to the situation under Qaddafi, the current government in Tripoli
is hoarding most of the income from oil exports, even though some 80 percent of
the country’s energy resources are located in the east. Indeed, Cyrenaica has
already started its separation from the Libyan state and maintain an
independent parliament, and this past June, it declared its independence.
Cyrenaicans have also shut down activity in the oil fields and the Benghazi
airport to protest government policy; Libya’s three important seaports have
been seized by armed militias that obstruct operations, and militia fighters
have taken control of several oil and gas complexes. In October, Cyrenaica
appointed a commander-in-chief for its 20,000-strong defense forces, whose job
will be to restore order to a region suffering from extreme instability. For
its part, Fezzan encompasses many different tribal and geographical identities.
The district, whose culture, tribes, and identity are more Sahel than North
African, declared independence in September. The central government in Tripoli
does not recognize the autonomy of the different districts but lacks the power
to impose its sovereignty.
Other nations lacking cohesive identity
are similarly vulnerable. In March 2013, Yemen embarked on a national dialogue
in order to arrive at an agreement over a new political order, but the
situation in practice does not allow for Sana’a to regain full control over all
parts of the state, and thus current ideas speak of a federal constellation. Some
in South Yemen insist on severing ties fully with the Yemeni state; in fact,
the status of the south is the biggest obstacle to the success of the national
dialogue. In the north, the Houthis, an insurgent Shiite group, have seized
Sa’da Province on the Saudi border, and are working to expand their control of
neighboring provinces while fighting Sunni salafis from Yemen and abroad.
Yemeni security forces are still fighting al-Qaeda for control of parts of the
south. Even if the national dialogue succeeds and Yemen embarks on a new course
as a united or federal state, there are enclaves that remain beyond Sana’a’s
effective control.
The disintegration of states represents
at least a temporary deterioration in Israel’s strategic situation because it
is attended by instability liable to trickle over into neighboring states.
Terrorism, crime, refugees, and weapons proliferation are only some of the
implications of failed states in Israel’s vicinity. But the changes also mean
dissolution of the regular armies that posed a threat in the past and present
opportunities for Israel to build relations with different minorities with the
potential to seize the reins of government in the future.
The changes to date have occurred inside the
existing borders, but this may not last. States are liable to disintegrate by
going through stages of federalization, agreed-upon separation, or autonomy.
Independent political entities that are not recognized either internationally
or by the central government may arise. There are also elements capable of
preventing the dissolution of states, e.g., assistance by external states
interested in stability, like in Yemen, or a shared interest, such as the oil
energy sources in Iraq. In general, the international community is opposed to
anyn, or autonomy. Independent political entities that are not recognized either internationally or by the central government may arise. There are also elements capable of preventing the dissolution of states, e.g., assistance by external states interested in stability, like in Yemen, or a shared interest, such as the oil energy sources in Iraq. In general, the international community is opposed to any changes in borders and the dissolution of states, believing that any change of the status quo is liable to destabilize the region and even the world. However, in the context of the regional turmoil, the Arab peoples are seeking the freedom to live in political settings that suit their respective identities. changes in borders and the dissolution of states, believing that
any change of the status quo is liable to destabilize the region and even the
world. However, in the context of the regional turmoil.
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