Doc's Talk: SAUDI 'HIDDEN HAND' STEERING IRAN NUCLEAR TALKS?

Friday, November 15, 2013

SAUDI 'HIDDEN HAND' STEERING IRAN NUCLEAR TALKS?

Featuring Simon Henderson

Middle East Voices

To read this interview on our website, go to:
http://washin.st/1duPExJ

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The first round of Iran nuclear talks in Geneva broke down earlier this month after the P5+1 failed to reach consensus on a short-term deal that would have eased up sanctions and allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium at reduced levels. Talks apparently ended over France's demand that Iran stop construction on a heavy water reactor at Arak, and there has been speculation that Saudi Arabia, along with Israel, may have been the 'hidden hand' guiding the course of negotiations. VOA's Cecily Hilleary asked Simon Henderson of The Washington Institute's Gulf and Energy Policy Program about Saudi Arabia's possible role in the impasse.

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Henderson: The Saudis, curiously, have much the same position as Israel. They feel threatened by Iran. They feel that they will be even more threatened by a nuclear Iran. They don't believe Iranian protestations that their nuclear program is for civilian purposes. And they are uncertain with the position of the U.S. and are very concerned that the U.S. is going to enter into a bad deal. And so less noticeably, perhaps, than [Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu, but not invisibly, the Saudis have been very active in lobbying in the absence of the U.S., where they seem to have given up, they've certainly been lobbying the French and, one can assume, the British and other significant groups as well.

Hilleary: What do you know about their talks with the French?

Henderson: Well, there are a number of little data points on this. One would have been the story which appeared in the Wall Street Journal on October 21st saying, "Saudi Spy Chief Breaks with the U.S." That was Prince Bandar speaking to "European diplomats." The "European diplomat" involved was the French ambassador. I mean, he hasn't said so. The Wall Street Journal hasn't revealed it. But I'm told it was the French ambassador.

And in the reporting which followed that and I'm not quite sure how it was sourced, responding to the question -- and I'm not sure exactly how it was asked of him -- "If you're not going to work with the U.S., who the hell are you going to work with?" The answer was France and Jordan. That was clearly an answer which probably applies in particular to Syria. And so that's one piece of information.

A second piece of information is that in the beginning of October -- October 7th or 8th -- the French defense minister went to Jeddah, and that was seen as an effort to secure a new defense contract. And he arrived on the same day as the visit from the Egyptian interim president, Adly Mansour, who was, in Saudi terms, clearly the more important, because the Saudis are delighted that Morsi's gone in Cairo and have endorsed the new regime. But despite it having therefore been a busy day for King Abdullah, Abdullah also saw the French defense minister. So this was, I thought, noteworthy.

And then [U.S. Secretary of State John] Kerry also on October 21st had lunch with [Saudi Foreign Minister] Saud al Faisal in Paris, and news that Saud al-Faisal was in Paris, as well, speaking to the French, and so these things all sort of fit together. It's not often that you can see the footprints to a murder scene, but in this case, you can -- if you like my metaphor.

Hilleary: What about Saudi Arabia and Israel? They are certainly odd bedfellows, but they've been getting cozier and cozier, at least in terms of their opposition to Iran. Is there communication between the two on this issue?

Henderson: No, there's been no reported coordination between Israel and Saudi Arabia, but everyone assumes that there is. I know, indeed have written, quite a few years ago, that in the late 1990s, the Saudis and Israel developed a back-channel intelligence link, the proverbial red telephone situation whereby even if they didn't like each other and they didn't agree with each other, they could at least tell each other why they didn't agree with each other, rather than have the information pass through third parties. I've got no doubt that there's probably an improved level of communication, i.e., not just at the intelligence level, but at a political level, so that both sides get a sense of what the political leadership of each country is thinking.

The Israelis also have a sort of under-the-radar relationship with the UAE, and that's been going on for some time and has only been reinforced by the UAE's perception of Iran.

Hilleary: There are really two basic questions, at this point. On November 20, the P5+1 are going to try and resume talks again. That gives Saudi and Israel ten more days to "wreak havoc." The first question is, are their doubts and fears legitimate in your eyes? And second, what can we expect to see over the next couple of weeks?

Henderson: Well, yes, in fact, the calendar for the next couple of weeks is, in fact, busier than that. It is noteworthy that Yukiya Amano, who's the head of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) was in Tehran and signed this agreement. But what the agreement doesn't cover is another aspect which the IAEA have been pressuring Iran on, which is to resolve something which the IAEA calls "possible military aspects." It essentially means, "What the hell were the Iranians doing at Parchin?" The Iranians say they were doing nothing. The IAEA's position, "That's fine. Come along, let's find the nothing." And the Iranians say, "There's nothing there, there's nothing to look at," which isn't a terribly satisfactory situation.

The other thing at the end of the month is there's the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, where Iran will again be discussed. That's on November the 28th. Discussion will essentially focus on the latest IAEA report on Iran, which will be distributed to the member governments in advance of that meeting, and although it's meant to be confidential, it's leaked within mini-seconds. And the timing when it comes out is usually ten days in advance -- on the 18th or so -- which is interesting because it's ahead of the 20th and 21st, the next round of Geneva talks. One can only guess, but if they've installed more centrifuges -- because at the moment, they've installed about 19,000 and are working about 10,000, of which 1,000 are the improved IR2ms. If these numbers have changed -- and frankly, they will probably only change upwards -- this will be an indication of their progress and possibly an indication of their good intentions -- although I hesitate to say "good intentions" because I take a rather jaundiced view and I don't think they've got good intentions. But who knows? They might be clever enough to actually not install any more and have fewer working, which will only confuse us even more.

Hilleary: What do we know about Saudi Arabia's nuclear intentions? There have been noises about Saudi Arabia going nuclear with the help of Pakistan, then denials of these reports.

Henderson: Well, one would sort of expect the denials, at least from Pakistan. Saudi Arabia made a statement, but it's not a denial, which they gave to the BBC on the day of the broadcast of the program (BBC Newsnight, Nov. 6), because the BBC said, "We're going to broadcast this program tonight. What have you got to say about it?" And so they released this statement. If you read it, it's not a denial. And so, that's, I think, an interesting comment.

I'm absolutely convinced such an arrangement exists. The way I have described it in the past is an understanding. Perhaps better than understanding. Somebody corrected me the other day and said there's an MOU -- a memorandum of understanding -- which suggests a physical written document. I have to track that aspect down. But as far as I'm concerned, this is the way the two countries think, and we know they think this way, and we'd like to dampen this story down, because if Saudi Arabia does go nuclear or has a fudged status, then it changes the Middle East and makes U.S. diplomacy even more difficult.

Hilleary: But is it just a threat to stop Iran -- or do you think they are committed to it? I mean as long as Israel has nuclear weapons, every other "kid on the block" is going to want them.

Henderson: Well, yes, but the answer to that point is that Israel has had nuclear weapons since probably the late 1960s and certainly the early 1970s. And yet Saudi Arabia is only thinking about doing it now, or perhaps has only been thinking about doing it for the last ten years. In other words, the thinking about doing it was in response to Iran, rather than to Israel. So okay, I know [former Iraqi leader] Saddam [Hussein] went for nukes and I know [former Libyan leader Moammar] Gadhafi was playing but in a sense, the fact it was Saddam and the fact it was Gadhafi sort of proves my point: Madmen will always go for nuclear weapons. And so the Israelis would say, "With madmen like that around, we need them." But with more sensible countries, they perhaps won't.

Hilleary: The irony here is that the biggest opponents to this nuclear agreement are the ones that would profit most by a non-nuclear Iran. Israel and Saudi Arabia are the biggest opponents. If a deal is not made, how much more dangerous does their neighborhood become?

Henderson: Oh, it becomes hugely dangerous. At the moment, you see, we are not talking about a deal. We're talking about a negotiation, [...] a framework. And the Israeli position in the sense that Netanyahu has said much more publically than anyone else, similar to the French, that this is much easier on the Iranians.

And my personal view is that it is. I mean in order to go forward in negotiations, we are sort of buying the Iranian narrative, which is, "Our program is peaceful. It's always been peaceful. We've never got any intentions that it should be anything other than peaceful. So accept that and we will perhaps negotiate it that you can come in and check that that's the case." But, in fact, in order to do that, we're going to have to remove sanctions, or some of them.

There's a piece in the Weekly Standard by Elliott Abrams, who is quoting from an American diplomatic cable which was first released by the New York Times. It dates from just before the [U.S.] embassy was seized in Tehran when the then charge d'affaires wrote a memo back to the State Department about what it was like to negotiate with the new revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini, and it still reads extraordinarily well. And indeed, Elliot Abrams has a point to make here. But, frankly, on the basis of the memo he's reporting, I think it's a legitimate point.

Hilleary: So what's the takeaway? Will we see any interim agreement in November or is this going to be squashed?

Henderson: I think what Israel wants, what France wants, what Saudi Arabia wants, what the Emiratis want, is some sort of maintenance of the front that Iran is up to no good, rather than the sort of, "We can only make this work if we assume that Iran is being innocent and we're just trying to get measures to confirm their innocence." This, to these countries, comes over as being hopelessly naive.

Now what about the other countries? Britain? I'm not sure where it's standing on that. I'm not sure where Germany is standing either. China and Russia like the P5 setup because it confers world status on them, but I don't think they've got any particular moral principles at stake. And the U.S. position is I think rather -- certainly optimistic and open to the additional description of being naively optimistic.

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Audio of this interview is available on the Middle East Voices website (http://middleeastvoices.voanews.com/2013/11/quicktake-saudi-hidden-hand-steering-iran-nuclear-talks-43262).

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The IDF’s Minorities in Numbers and Pictures

In honor of IDF Diversity Week, we present diversity through numbers and pictures. Each year, more and more Muslims, Christians, Druze, Bedouin and immigrants from around the world take on the responsibility of defending Israel.

MUSLIMS:

Muslim Arab Israelis are not required to draft in the IDF, but there are many who volunteer. In 2013, there were over 200 Muslims serving in the IDF and over 300 in the reserves.

Bedouins:

Bedouins are nomadic Muslims who were in Israel when modern borders were set in place and are now considered Israeli citizens. They are not required to draft but a growing number choose to enlist. In 2012, there were over 1,400 Bedouin Muslim soldiers doing regular IDF service and almost 1,500 in the reserves.

Read more:http://www.idfblog.com/2014/02/27/truth-idf-numbers-pictures/#more-34027

Are you aware that in 2013, Middle class taxes go up-significantly?

In January of next year, the federal income tax rate for middle-class taxpayers is scheduled to rise from 25 percent to 28 percent, and the payroll tax is scheduled to rise from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent… This drives the marginal tax rate based on the aforementioned three taxes to 48.12 percent. Add in state and local property, corporate, excise, and other state and local taxes, and the percentage of each additional dollar that is taxed hovers around 50 percent… When half of each additional dollar earned is taxed away, taxpayers experience a disincentive to start businesses or expand existing ones. This leads to fewer jobs being created.

Why is HAMAS Inside Tampa Schools?

Clare Lopez

Kelly Miliziano, who teaches history classes at Steinbrenner High School in the Tampa, Florida area apparently thinks it’s perfectly OK to invite a senior official of a HAMAS-affiliated organization into her classroom to discuss Islam with her students. According to local media reports, not only has this been going on for years, but in spite of the civil and criminal proceedings that could result from such reckless negligence, the Hillsborough County school superintendent, Mary Ellen Elia, and the chairman of the school board, Candy Olson, also expressed approval for students under their responsibility to be exposed repeatedly to guest speaker, Hassan Shibly, who is the Executive Director for the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in the Tampa area.
More...

Did You Know... Ignoring the Call to Islam will Bring Jihad

‘Conquest through Da’wa [proselytizing] that is what we hope for. We will conquer Europe, we will conquer America! Not through sword but through Da’wa.’
-- Yousef al-Qaradawi , Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader The Arabic word ‘Da’wa’ means the “call to Islam.” But do not think that Da’wa is the same thing as an invitation to an optional holiday event. The classical Islamic doctrine of jihad mandates that enemies must be given the opportunity to convert to Islam or pay the jizya tax before it is permissible to attack them.
Clare M. Lopez

Who is being discriminated-facts tell the truth

Religious bias

Hate crimes motivated by religious bias accounted for 1,409 offenses reported by law enforcement. A breakdown of the bias motivation of religious-bias offenses showed:

65.4 percent were anti-Jewish.
13.2 percent were anti-Islamic.
9.5 percent were anti-other religion, i.e., those not specified.
4.3 percent were anti-Catholic.
3.8 percent were anti-multiple religions, group.
3.3 percent were anti-Protestant.
0.5 percent were anti-Atheism/Agnosticism/etc.

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/hate-crime/2010/narratives/hate-crime-2010-incidents-and-offenses.

On March 31, 1977, the Dutch newspaper Trouw published an interview

with PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein. Here's what he said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct "Palestinian people" to oppose Zionism.

For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

In March 1977, Zahir Muhsein, a PLO executive, said:

"The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese. Only for political and tactical reasons do we speak today about the existence of a Palestinian people, since Arab national interests demand that we posit the existence of a distinct Palestinian people to oppose Zionism."

"For tactical reasons, Jordan, which is a sovereign state with defined borders, cannot raise claims to Haifa and Jaffa, while as a Palestinian, I can undoubtedly demand Haifa, Jaffa, Beer-Sheva and Jerusalem. However, the moment we reclaim our right to all of Palestine, we will not wait even a minute to unite Palestine and Jordan."

The Arab Apartheid

Ben-Dror Yemini
In 1948, the Arab countries refused to accept the UN partition proposal and they launched a war of annihilation against the State of Israel which had barely been established. All precedents in this matter showed that the party that starts the war - and with a declaration of annihilation, yet - pays a price for it. Between 550,000 and 710,000 Arabs fled because of the war and a larger number of 850,000 Jews were expelled or fled from Arab countries (the "Jewish nakba").
Population exchanges and expulsions were the norm at that time, occurring in dozens of other conflict points and affecting about 52 million people. In all the population exchange precedents that occurred during or at the end of an armed conflict, there was no return of refugees to the previous region, which had turned into a new national state.
Only the Arab states acted completely differently from the rest of the world. Instead of assimilating the refugees, they crushed them despite the fact that they were their coreligionists and members of the Arab nation - instituting a regime of apartheid. So the "nakba" was not caused by the actual dispossession, which had also been experienced by tens of millions of others. The "nakba" is the story of the apartheid, oppression, abuse and denial of rights suffered by the Arab refugees at the hands of the Arab countries. (Maariv)

International Law and Military Operations in Practice - Col. Richard Kemp

"Islamist fighting groups study the international laws of armed conflict carefully and they understand it well. They know that a British or Israeli commander and his men are bound by international law and the rules of engagement that flow from it. They then do their utmost to exploit what they view as one of their enemy's main weaknesses. Their very modus operandi is built on the correct assumption that Western armies will normally abide by the rules, while these insurgents employ a deliberate policy of operating consistently outside international law. "

Lost Historical Moments

What Rabin’s last Knesset speech really said:repudiation of a Palestinian state

Rabin ruled out a fully sovereign Palestinian state :

“We view the permanent solution in the framework of State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority.”

Rabin ruled out a total withdrawal from Judea and Samaria and thus a return to the pre-June 1967 borders :

“The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”

Rabin ruled out withdrawing form the Jordan Valley:

“The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.”

Rabin ruled out uprooting settlement blocs, like the Gush Katif bloc in Gaza (which was subsequently uprooted by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon):

“The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif.

AND

Rabin ruled out removing any settlement before coming to a full peace agreement with the Palestinians:

“I want to remind you: we committed ourselves, that is, we came to an agreement, and committed ourselves before the Knesset, not to uproot a single settlement in the framework of the interim agreement, and not to hinder building for natural growth.”

Rabin insisted on Israel retaining full security control of the borders with Egypt and Jordan, contrary to Israel’s relinquishment of the Philadelphia Corridor on the border with Egypt:

“The responsibility for external security along the borders with Egypt and Jordan, as well as control over the airspace above all of the territories and Gaza Strip maritime zone, remains in our hands.”

Correcting Oslo Myths-Part 2

3) Kuttab laments that the post-1993 Oslo process resulted in a Palestinian Authority "whose ministers and legislators are not guaranteed passage between Gaza and the West Bank ...."

Before free passage or other perquisites, PA leaders were obligated, among other things, to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, end anti-Israeli, antisemitic incitement in schools, mosques, and communications media, and resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful negotiations. They met none of these commitments, sometimes bolstering terrorism and greatly increasing incitement.

4) Kuttab complains that under Oslo the PA got "lightly armed police ---- but no real sovereignty over the land or contiguity between our communities in Gaza and the West Bank."

Oslo agreements repeatedly were revised, regardless of Palestinian non-compliance, until the authorized number of police grew from 8,000 to 40,000. Though they were to be the only armed forces in the territories, Israeli estimates early in the second intifada put the number of gunmen - police, "security services," terrorists, and armed gangs - at 85,000. Their armament reportedly included not only heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, but also anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles.

Sovereignty was to be negotiated in the envisioned 1998 "final status" talks - after a five-year period of confidence-building. Palestinian leadership chronically undermined the process. Palestinian terrorism made the 1993 - 1998 Oslo period more deadly for Israelis than the 15 years preceding it.

The United States doesn't have contiguity between the lower 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii; territorial contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip - that is, through the 20 miles of Israeli territory between them - was never promised and would destroy Israeli contiguity.

5) "Palestinians have been made to endure hundreds of checkpoints in the West Bank, an eight-foot wall deep in our territories, and tight Israeli control over borders."

The security barrier is not "deep in Palestinian territories," but rather encompasses less than 8 percent of Judea and Samaria, and is mostly a fence, rarely a wall; the land in question is not "our [Palestinian] territories" but disputed territory to which, according to the authors of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, Jews as well as Arabs have claims; and there are no international borders, only the 1949 armistice lines with Jordan. Under 242, borders remain to be negotiated. As for checkpoints - like the security barrier and "tight Israeli control" - Palestinian Arabs precipitated these measures themselves. No terrorism and there would be no fence or tight Israeli control and few checkpoints - like before the first intifada.

Correcting Some Oslo Myths

1) In Oslo "Israeli, Palestinian and other world leaders promised that ... Palestinian sovereignty would be solidified."

No, they didn't. The 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent Oslo agreements outlined a process by which final status negotiations about the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be reached. The process required an end to anti-Israel terrorism and incitement and a commitment to peaceful negotiations. The PA, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and other terrorist groups, sabotaged the process from the start.

2) "The reality is that, in defiance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force, Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation."
Wrong again. Resolution 242 (1967) does note "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." It also affirms the right of every state in the area "to live in peace with secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." There were no "Palestinian territories." Jordan occupied the West Bank, Egypt controlled Gaza. Israel did not have "secure and recognized boundaries," so retention of some of those territories was possible under 242. Israel is not a "foreign" military occupier in the West Bank but, pending final negotiations, the lawful military administrator as a result of a successful war of self-defense.

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