I
am amazed at the current U.S. debate over Syria. Those urging
intervention may be driven by humanitarian good intentions, to end the
fighting and ease suffering. But whatever they are proposing--no-fly
zones, safe havens, direct supply of weapons to rebels, etc—have they
actually
considered how four highly visible, recent precedents turned out?
Afghanistan:
There is no question but that after September 11, 2001, the United
States had to invade Afghanistan, destroy the al-Qaida infrastructure
there, and overthrow its Taliban partner. Yet today, twelve years later
U.S. troops are still in Afghanistan! The delusion of rebuilding that
country has predictably failed. About 2200 Americans have died, many of
them killed by Afghan “allies.” The Afghan government is not exactly
“grateful.” The Taliban is still strong. Again, that war was necessary
but how worthwhile was it and how expensive and difficult has it been
for the United States to extricate itself. Even after 4 and one-half
years of Barack Obama U.S. soldiers are still there.
Egypt:
U.S. intervention in Egypt overthrew an ally. Many Egyptians now see,
despite the talk about democracy, that they are worse off. Talk about
freedom quickly turned into domination by the Muslim Brotherhood and
Salafist mobs. The economy is going down the drain. Christians are under
siege; women’s rights are shrinking. Other than a free media it is hard
to see what Egyptians got out of it. Certainly, this intervention was a
strategic defeat for the United States.
Iraq:
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, about 4500 American soldiers
have been killed. Tens of billions of dollars have been spent. Whether
or not the war was worthwhile can still be debated. The Iraqis have
suffered greatly yet have also gained the most of the four cases cited
here but it is still estimated that about 200,000 Iraqis have died,
mainly in sectarian fighting, which still continues today though at a
lower level. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein unleashed a Sunni-Shia war
of terrorism that could be dwarfed by what might happen in Syria. The
U.S. forces were said to be needed to remain in the country until a new
Iraqi army was trained. On strategic grounds, Iraq has turned around
sharply though it is still too friendly with Iran for U.S. tastes and
supports the Bashar Assad regime in Syria. It is also a country where
the
vice-president had to flee after the prime minister charged him with
terrorism.
Libya:
In this case, U.S. involvement was indirect and caused no U.S.
casualties. While the overthrow of dictator Muammar Qadhafi would have
been a boon to U.S. strategic interests in earlier years, by the time it
actually happened Qadhafi was relatively neutralized. Being governed
by an elected regime may be counted as a gain for Libyans but anarchy,
rule by militia, and extremism is still strong. Arms from Libyan
arsenals were smuggled to terrorists in different countries. And of
course the murder of four Americans in Benghazi shows the continued
existence of
terrorists—even al-Qaida—the weakness of the government and the
unpredictability of Libya’s future.
This
is a complex picture. Four dictatorships have been overthrown and four
elected governments replaced them. How to measure the change?
U.S.
strategic gains? It is true that the removal of the Taliban and Saddam
Hussein—two of America’s most active enemies—was a clear gain. But once
having said that, it is not clear that these four governments contribute
much to real U.S.
interests.
Egypt’s
change is negative. Libya is a client state yet its main usefulness has
been to funnel arms and money to opposition Islamist groups in Syria.
Iraq is not helpful on two priority U.S. interests, Iran and Syria.
Afghanistan is still angry at the United States and continues to be a
playground for Pakistani intrigues with anti-American Islamists. Plus
the fact that Pakistan had obtained billions of dollars in U.S. aid
while giving safe haven to the very al-Qaida leaders that the money was
paid to have them help catch.
Now
there come demands for an escalated U.S. intervention in Syria, as if
none of these precedents need to be considered. Yes, the advocates of
involvement usually don’t seek direct military action. True, they are
upset at the death of 70,000 people, with the number certain to rise
higher. This is not a partisan issue. The Obama government's policy
helped create this mess by helping to build up an Islamist leadership in
Syria--misled by the Turkish regime. But the Obama Administration's
current apparent reluctance to escalate involvement is a good idea,
though perhaps motivated by the wrong reasons.
Yet what are the arguments on the other side?
--Does
the United States want to fight on some level to install a radical
Islamist regime in Syria that is certain to be anti-American?
--How
will Americans feel if their aid and weapons are used in future to
murder Alawites and Christians, perhaps some day to invade the Kurdish
autonomous area, passed to terrorists in other countries, used to shoot
down civilian airliners by such terrorists, and suppress moderate Sunni
Muslims?
--Do
Americans really expect gratitude or friendship or strategic
cooperation from revolutionary Islamists for their help in winning the
civil war?
--Is the United States then going to give billions of dollars to rebuild Syria's economy for an Islamist regime?
--Does
the United States have the necessary influence and leverage to force
Jabhat al-Nusra's (Syrian al-Qaida) allies to abandon it? No. It already
tried to do so and failed miserably.
--Despite
all the vague talk about moderate fighters how many such people
actually exist? Ironically, most of them are defectors from Assad's
army, who don't have such a pro-democratic record. But the main drawback
is that they are very weak and disorganized. Talk of setting up a zone
under their control is absurd.
Don’t
get me wrong. On balance, I’d like to see the Assad regime fall and to
see an end to the suffering of Syrian civilians. From a strategic
standpoint, though, the fact that the Sunni and Shia Islamists—who both
want to destroy U.S. interests and wipe
Israel off the map—are battling in Syria may not be the worst thing in
the world.
Remember,
too, that the United States covertly intervened in the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988) on the side of Iraq, for reasons that could well be
justified, but ended up fighting two wars against Iraq in the next
fifteen years.
Remember
that Americans cheered the downfall of the repressive shah only to see a
more repressive, far more aggressive, and far more anti-American regime
replace it, not to mention the
seizure of American hostages.
Remember
also that Americans cheered the downfall of the Libyan dictator only to
see a raging anarchy in which American diplomats were not taken hostage
but murdered. Today, their killers walk the streets of Benghazi
providing security, untouchable by Libya’s government, laughing at the
Americans who empowered them.
Things in the Middle East are not so simple.
This article is published on PJMedia.
Please be subscriber 31,457 (among more than 50,000 total readers). Put email address in upper right-hand box: http://www.rubinreports.blogspot.com
We’d love to have your support and work hard to earn it. See our new feature with 13 free books at http://www.gloria-center.org. Why not make a tax-deductible donation to the GLORIA Center by PayPal: click here.
By credit card: click here.
Checks: "American Friends of IDC.” “For GLORIA Center” on memo line and
send to: American Friends of IDC, 116 East 16th St., 11th Fl., NY, NY
10003.
--------------------
Barry
Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs
(GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International
Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His next
book, Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East,
written with Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, will be published by Yale University
Press in January 2014. His latest book is Israel: An Introduction, also published by Yale. Thirteen of his books can be read and downloaded for free at the website of the GLORIA Center including The Arab States and the
Palestine Conflict, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East and The Truth About Syria. His blog is Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.
Professor Barry Rubin, Director, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center http://www.gloria-center.org
Forthcoming Book: Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East (Yale University Press)
The Rubin Report blog http://rubinreports.blogspot.com/
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
He is a featured columnist at PJM http://pajamasmedia.com/barryrubin/.
Editor, Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal http://www.gloria-center.org
Editor Turkish Studies,http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713636933%22
No comments:
Post a Comment